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WINNER, BEST APPELLATE BRIEF IN THE 1998-99
NATIVE AMERICAN LAW STUDENT ASSOCIATION
MOOT COURT COMPETITION
Lisa F. Cook Gambler & Melissa E. Stephenson*
Questions Presented
I. Whether the Muscogee (Creek) Nation government, reorganized under
the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act (OIWA) maintains jurisdiction to
promulgate regulations over lands within Nation territory when the territory
has not been disestablished or diminished, and the health and welfare of the
tribe is at stake.
II. Whether the Muscogee (Creek) Nation maintains jurisdiction over
waters within the Nation territory which includes the Arkansas River under
either the doctrine of collateral estoppel or the Winter's doctrine.
Im. Whether the Muscogee (Creek) Nation meets the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) criteria to qualify for Treatment As a State (TAS)
status and therefore the EPA approval of the Nation's application is valid.
Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1).
Statement of the Case
. Proceedings and Disposition of the Court Below
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, is
unreported. That opinion reversed the United States District Court grant of
summary judgment to Appellant Tulsa, and upheld the EPA approval of the
Treatment As a State (TAS) application to the Muscogee (Creek) Nation in
June 1998.
The Order of the United States District Court for Oklahoma, dated October
1997, is also unreported. That Order granted summary judgment to Tulsa.
II. Statement of Facts
The facts of this case are in dispute. The Muscogee (Creek) Nation
(hereinafter Muscogee Nation or the Nation), formerly identified as the Creeks
by non-Indian settlers, is one of the "Five Civilized Tribes," a federally
* Third-year law students, University of New Mexico.
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recognized Indian nation with its territory and population centered in eastern
Oklahoma. In January 1996, the Muscogee Nation reestablished the traditional
green corn harvest religious ceremonial to give thanks for the resurgence of
Muscogee government and its economic successes. (Jt. App. 3) The Nation
chose a site on 100 acres of original Nation fee land in Tulsa, in recognition
of the role that towns like Tallasi Town (Muscogee language for Tulsa) had
in the great Creek Confederacy. (Jt. App. 3) The ceremony, of deep religious
and economic significance to the Muscogee Nation, utilizes waters of the
Arkansas River. (Jt. App. 3)
The Muscogee Nation was concerned about water pollution from the city
of Tulsa wastewater treatment plant operated by the city of Tulsa twelve miles
upstream from the ceremonial site on the Arkansas River. (Jt. App. 3) The
plant operates under an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administered
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. (Jt. App.3)
The Muscogee Nation sought recognition from the EPA for Treatment As a
State (TAS) as encouraged by the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act
(CWA). See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e). (Jt. App. 3) The EPA granted the Nation
TAS status in August 1996. (Jt. App. 3) The Muscogee Nation then legislated
water quality standards (WQS) for the section of the Arkansas River in
dispute in this case and all other water within Muscogee Nation borders. (Jt.
App.3)
Tulsa filed the present action in January 1997 in response to the EPA's
planned revision of Tulsa's NPDES permit to comply with the Muscogee
Nation's WQS. (Jt. App. 3) Tulsa challenges Muscogee Nation TAS status
based on allegations of insufficient tribal jurisdiction, and inappropriate EPA
administrative action. (Jt. App. 4)
III. Standard of Review
The issues presented in this appeal are issues of law and are reviewed de
novo. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9' Cir. 1984) (en banc).
Summary of Argument
The Muscogee Nation and the EPA request affirmation of the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision validating and enforcing EPA's approval of the
Muscogee Nation's application for TAS status.
The Muscogee Nation has maintained jurisdiction over lands within its
territory, including the bed of the Arkansas River and the Mackey Site. The
Nation's jurisdiction over lands within its original borders has not been
disestablished nor diminished by the Curtis Act or the Five Tribes Act.
Moreover, the limitation established on Muscogee Nation governmental
functions by those two Acts, the presidential approval power over all proposed
tribal legislation, was repealed by the OIWA.
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The Muscogee Nation has also maintained jurisdiction over waters within
Nation territory which include a portion of the Arkansas River. As a threshold
matter, the city of Tulsa should be precluded from litigating this issue again
because the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to Oklahoma's rights as to
all sections of the Arkansas River running over territory granted to the Five
Civilized Tribes. In the alternative, the Winter's Doctrine reserves to the
Muscogee Nation a quality of territory water to fulfill the purposes of the
reservation and guarantee habitability for the Nation's people.
The Muscogee Nation meets all of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) criteria to qualify for Treatment As a State (TAS): (1) It has a
governing body carrying out substantial governmental duties; (2) It seeks to
apply water quality standards which pertain to protection of water resources
held by the Nation or otherwise within the borders of an Indian reservation;
and (3) In the EPA Administrator's judgment, the Nation can carry out its
technical functions in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes of
CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1988).
Argument
a. Historical Background
As in so many cases involving Native American rights, the facts of this
case hinge on specific historical events that are subject to more than one
interpretation. Aboriginal Muscogee Nation land was located in what is now
the state of Georgia. Due to non-Indian influx into that region and demand for
land, the Muscogee Nation was removed by the U.S. Government to Indian
Territory which today is part of the state of Oklahoma. See Removal Treaty,
Mar. 24, 1832, art. IV, 7 Stat. 366 (provision for land patents to the Creek
Nation from the United States).
In exchange for cession of lands east of the Mississippi River, the United
States conveyed this new land in Indian Territory with title in fee simple to
the Muscogee Nation. Id. at art IV. The Treaty of 1832 also guaranteed to the
Muscogee Nation the perpetual right of self-government. Id. at art. XIV.
The Muscogee Nation later fought for the confederacy during the Civil
War, and in punishment the United States took the western half of Indian
Territory, designating it as "Oklahoma Territory." See Oklahoma Territory
Organic Act, May 2, 1890, § 1-28, 26 Stat. 81. The eastern half of Indian
Territory, however, remained in fee simple title as property of the Indian
Nations, with specific land forever set apart in fee simple as a home for the
Muscogee Nation. See Treaty with the Creek Indians, June 14, 1866, art. II,
14 Stat. 785, 786-87 (forever setting aside Creek lands). The original
boundaries of the Muscogee Nation bordered on the west by a north-south
running line running through present day Seminole, Oklahoma. (Jt. App. 1)
The southern border was marked by the Canadian River, the northern border
was an east-west line running just above present day Tulsa, Oklahoma, and
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the eastern border ran northeast from Eufala, Oklahoma, to Fort Gibson, and
then continued directly north to Chouteau, Oklahoma. (Jt. App. 1)
In 1867, Congress passed the General Allotment Act (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 331 et. seq. (1983)). Its purpose was to assimilate tribes
consistent with the future goal of terminating tribal reservation land bases.
FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 128 (1982) (emphasis
added). Muscogee Nation land, like that of the other Five Civilized Tribes,
was excluded from the Allotment Act because those Indian Nations held their
lands in :Fee simple. See 25 U.S.C. § 339. Congress believed that because the
Five Tribes held their land in fee, rather than by aboriginal title of occupation
held in trust by the federal government, those Indian Nations could not be
divested of their territories without their consent. However, the land fever and
anti-tribal sentiment was strong during this period in American history, so in
1893 Congress created the Dawes Commission to negotiate allotment
agreements with, among others, the Muscogee Nation. See Act of Mar. 3,
1893, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 612.
The Muscogee Nation resisted all efforts to open any part of their territory
to non-Indian settlement. Congress responded by adding several coercive
provisions to the Indian Department Appropriations Act, June 7, 1897, ch. 3,
30 Stat. 62. One of these provisions provided for presidential approval power
over all laws passed by any of the councils of the Five Tribes. Id. at 62. The
Muscogee Nation continued to insist on its legal rights conferred by treaty and
fee title ownership of its territories. Consequently, Congress passed the Curtis
Act, which provided for strong-arm forced allotment of tribal lands without
tribal consent unless the tribe "agreed" to allotment. See Act of June 28,
1898, § 28, 30 Stat. 495, 504-05. The Curtis Act was enacted with the
understanding that Muscogee title did not allow for unilateral divestment, and
minimally required the "consent" of the Muscogee Nation to allow for any
allotment. Id.
The Curtis Act resulted in an agreement with the Muscogee Nation that
provided for the termination of the entire Muscogee government by Act of
Mar. 1, 1901, ch. 676, 31 Stat. 861. However, continued Muscogee Nation
resistance and administrative difficulties resulted in the passage of the Five
Tribes Act of April 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137, in which Congress expressly
perpetuated the existence and government of each of the Five Tribes.
Subsequent courts have held that throughout this upheaval the Muscogee
government persisted. See Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439
(D.C. Cir. 1988). Neither the Curtis Act nor the Five Tribes Act ever
mentioned water rights, nor did they contain express language that abrogated
or diminished the original boundaries of Muscogee tribal territory.
In 1936, Congress passed the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act (OIWA). See
Act of June 26, 1936, 49 Stat. 1967 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 501 et. seq.
(1983)). The OIWA, like the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) passed two
years before (Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984, as amended (Indian
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Reorganization Act), 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq.) provided for constitutional
governments and corporate charters for Indian tribes in Oklahoma. The self-
government provision of the OIWA is different from the IRA, however, and
does not contain the same limiting language. See Oklahoma Indian Welfare
Act, § 3, 25 U.S.C. § 503. See also Indian Reorganization Act §§ 461 et.
seq., 25 U.S.C. 476.
In 1979, under the authority of the OIWA, the Muscogee Nation adopted
a new constitution. This constitution expressly secured the boundaries of the
Nation's territory as they appeared in 1900 based upon the treaties between
the U.S. government and the Muscogee Nation. The Muscogee Nation
government established under the 1979 constitution applied to the EPA for
Treatment As a State (TAS) status under the Clean Water Act (CWA).
Following EPA approval, the Muscogee Nation passed the water quality
standards at issue in this case.
The CWA prohibits discharges from a point source of any pollutant into
waters unless the discharge complies with the Act's requirements. See 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a). The National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit requires emission compliance from dischargers. See 33
U.S.C. § 1342. NPDES permits are issued by EPA or, in those jurisdictions
in which EPA has authorized a state agency to administer the NPDES
program, such as Oklahoma since 1996, by a state agency subject to EPA
review. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). Where a state is granted authority to
administer the NPDES program, the EPA continues to administer NPDES
permits for federal territories not within state jurisdiction. See 56 Fed. Reg.
64876.
Under the NPDES program, each state must adopt water quality standards
for its waters. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313. These standards are subject to review
and approval by EPA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a). Once water quality standards
have been adopted, either the EPA or a state will issue NPDES permits only
to dischargers who are in compliance with the state's standards. See U.S.C.
§ 1341(a). Regardless of whether the EPA or a state is granting NPDES
permits, all upstream permits must comply with legitimate downstream water
quality standards. See generally, Arkansas v. Oklahoma et al., 503 U.S. 91
(1992).
In 1987, Congress added 1377(e) to the CWA that authorizes EPA to
permit tribes to be "treated as a state" (TAS) for the purposes of establishing
water quality standards. See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e). EPA issued a final rule in
1991 implementing this provision by setting forth the standards for processing
tribal requests for TAS status and the attached authority to establish these
standards. See 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876 (1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §
131.8(b)(3)). It is EPA approval of Muscogee Nation TAS status under these
regulations that are at issue in the present case.
No. 1]
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b. Analysis
L The Muscogee (Creek) Nation, Reorganized Under the Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Act Which Repealed the Curtis Act and Five Tribes Act, Maintains
Jurisdiction to Promulgate Regulations Over Lands Within Nation Territory
Because the Territory Has Not Been Disestablished Nor Diminished, And
the Health and Welfare of the Tribe is at Stake.
A. Muscogee Nation Territory Has Not Been Disestablished.
The duscogee Nation jurisdiction over lands within its original national
borders has not been disestablished. To determine whether tribal rights to
territory and land have been disestablished, this court should apply the test set
out in United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). Disestablishment of tribal
treaty rights is an abrogation of those rights. Abrogation of treaty rights
should never be lightly imputed; however, where Congress has explicitly used
its authority to abrogate a Native American treaty right, Congressional will
controls. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586 (1977).
There is no explicit language in either the Curtis Act or the Five Tribes
Act disestablishing the Muscogee Nation's original territorial boundaries.
Because of the lack of specific language in these Acts, the presumption is
strong that there was no Congressional intention to abrogate territory granted
in the Treaty of 1866. See Treaty with the Creek Indians, June 14, 1866, art.
111, 14 Stat. 785, 786-87 (guaranteeing Muscogee territory in fee with the
promise that no part of the land should ever be embraced in any territory or
state).
In Dion, the Court considered whether a Native American who takes an
eagle on tribal land violates the Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668(a)
(1962). See Dion, 476 U.S. at 737. Dion stated that the preference for an
explicit statement by Congress was not a per se rule. Id. at 739. However, the
Court in that case established that there must be "clear evidence that Congress
actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand
and Indian treaty rights on the other and chose to resolve that conflict by
abrogating the treaty." Id. at 740.
The Dion test established a high standard of proof for abrogation. Id. at
741. Dion is consistent with the long settled tenet that Indian treaty rights are
too fundamental to be easily cast aside, and "absent explicit statutory
language, [the courts] have been extremely reluctant to find Congressional
abrogation of treaty rights ... "" Washington v. Washington Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979).
The Curtis Act and the Five Tribes Act admittedly were enacted with the
future elimination of Muscogee Nation territory and eventual Muscogee
Nation assimilation in mind. But as this Court has said,
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acts that sought to achieve the same ends in a specific situation
as allotment did in general, . . . which was to continue the
reservation system and the trust status of Indian lands, but to allot
tracts to individual Indians and to promote interaction between the
races and encouraging the Indians to adopt white ways, . . . do
not, alone, recite or even suggest that Congress intended thereby
to terminate [those specific reservations or trust status lands].
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 490 (1973).
Under even the broadest application of the Dion test, however, neither the
Curtis Act nor the Five Tribes Act abrogated the Muscogee Nation's external
territorial boundaries conferred under the Treaty with the Creek Indians. See
Treaty of June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. at 785. Neither the Curtis Act nor the Five
Tribes Act contains language that expressly abrogates the territorial boundaries
of the Five Civilized Tribes. See Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 612.
See also Act of Mar. 4, 1906 (Act of Mar. 1, 1901, ch. 676, 31 Stat. 861). In
addition, neither the legislative history nor surrounding circumstances of these
two Acts show the required Congressional consideration of Muscogee Nation
treaty rights plus the intention by Congress to abrogate those rights. Id.
Consequently, when the Dion test is applied to the facts in this case, this
Court must reject Tulsa's claim that the Muscogee Nation had been
disestablished with regard to its territorial boundaries.
B. Muscogee Nation Territory Has Not Been Diminished.
The Muscogee Nation's external boundaries have not been diminished in
geographic scope. Although the Curtis Act, June 28, 1898, § 28, 30 Stat. 495,
504-05 [hereinafter Curtis Act], subjected the Muscogee Nation's land base to
coerced allotment, the Muscogee national land base was not diminished. This
Court has never been willing to "extrapolate from early twentieth century
colonial ideas about the purported demise of Indian reservations any specific
congressional purpose to diminish reservations with the passage of every
surplus land act." See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1984). This
ruling also applies to Indian lands held in fee, or in arrangements not typically
referred to as "reservations." See generally Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991)
(holding that trust lands validly set apart for the use of Indians qualified as
"reservations" for the purposes of defining Indian Country). The first
principle of the Solem test dictates that once land is set aside as "Indian
Country" it remains so unless Congress explicitly indicates otherwise,
regardless of the title status of individual plots within its boundaries. See U.S.
v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909). Nor will diminishment be lightly
inferred. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 615 (1977). In this
case, the standard for finding diminishment is even higher because the Five
Civilized Tribes held their land in fee, and thus possessed land rights superior
to other Indian tribes. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
No. 1]
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Indeed, this Court has specifically acknowledged that the Five Civilized Tribes
held their title under special historical circumstances that gave them superior
title to other "reservation" Indians. Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
A small group of surplus land acts have been found to diminish
reservations. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 615 (holding that the
Rosebud Sioux Reservation was diminished because surrounding
circumstances of congressional activity unequivocally demonstrated that
Congress evinced intent to change boundaries). See also DeCoteau v. District
County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444-45 (1975) (explaining that the reservation
was diminished due to express reference to cession and total surrender of all
tribal interests).
Most surplus acts, however, did not diminish reservations. See generally
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973) (holding the reservation not
diminished when both act and legislative history fail to provide substantial and
compelling evidence of congressional intent to diminish). See also Seymour
v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962) ("Indian country" not diminished
because statutory language, "notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,"
applies with equal force to fee patents issued to non-Indians and Indians
alike).
In Rosebud and DeCoteau, this Court found language of diminishment in
legislative action towards specific tribes that contained clear expression of
congressional intent to diminish. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 615.
See also DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. at 425. In both cases,
the tribes involved were located on reservation land held in trust for the tribe
by the U.S. government, and possessed only aboriginal title. See Rosebud
Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 586. See also DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 427.
Conversely, in Mattz and Seymour, despite the extensive allotment of land to
non-Indians within original tribal territory, this Court did not find any clear
expression of congressional intent to diminish reservation boundaries. See
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. at 481. See also Seymour v. Superintendent, 368
U.S. at 351.
To determine whether Muscogee Nation territory was diminished, it is
necessary to examine two factors. First, this Court must look at the history
of congressional dealings with the Nation through Congressional enactments
and the surrounding circumstances of that legislation. Second, this Court must
consider the facts in the instant case in light of the analyses provided in the
above-cited case law to determine whether under Solem this court should find
Muscogee Nation territorial diminishment.
In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment Act (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331 et seq. (1983)), which provided that lands held in trust
for Indians by the United States would be divided up and parcels given to
individual Indians in fee simple. The General Allotment Act, § 8, specifically
excluded the Five Civilized Tribes, including the Muscogee Nation, from
application of the Act because their lands were held in fee simple title. Id.
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The superior quality of the title held by these Nations meant that these Tribes
would have to consent to allotment to be divested of their property right. See
Woodward v. De Graffenried, 238 U.S. 284, 294 (1915). Thus, the Allotment
Act was passed with the understanding that Congress did not have the
authority to unilaterally diminish the exterior boundaries of the Muscogee
Nation held in fee simple.
Congress then empowered the Dawes Commission to negotiate consensual
allotment agreements with the Five Civilized Tribes. See Act of Mar. 3, 1893,
ch. 209, 27 Stat. 612, 645. Because the Tribes refused to negotiate with the
Dawes Commission to allot their lands, several coercive provisions were later
added into the Appropriations Act of June 7, 1897. 30 Stat. 62. One of these
provisions was the requirement for presidential approval power over all
legislation of the Five Civilized Tribes. Id. at ch. 3. With this provision, the
Tribes' governments were essentially held hostage to the allotment process.
They could not receive much needed monies to assist their people unless their
governments surrendered to a presidential approval provision.
Although the Seminole Nation reached an agreement with ihe Dawes
Commission, the Muscogee Nation continued to resist agreement to allot its
lands. See Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1441 (D.C. Cir.
1988). Although a tentative agreement was reached between the Nation and
the Dawes Commission, the Nation did not consent to abolish any of its title
to its lands, and never consented to a diminishment of Muscogee Nation
borders. See Creek Agreement, Mar. 1, 1901, 31 Stat. 861.
Congress then passed the Curtis Act to force allotment and eventual
termination of the Five Civilized Tribes. This Act incorporated the tentative
Muscogee Nation agreement providing that this agreement would supersede
any inconsistent provisions of the Curtis Act if ratified by October 1, 1898.
The Muscogee Nation never voted to ratify the tentative agreement
incorporated in the Curtis Act, but Congress proceeded to allot sections of
land to non-Indians within Muscogee Nation territorial boundaries.
The facts in this case can be distinguished from the facts in Rosebud v.
Kneip, and DeCoteau v. District County Court, and are more closely
analogous to the facts in Mattz v. Arnett, and Seymour v. Superintendent. As
recounted above, neither the Curtis Act nor the Five Tribes Act contains the
type of explicit language of diminishment found in Rosebud or DeCoteau, nor
any other expression of congressional intent to immediately diminish the
territorial boundaries of the Muscogee Nation. In addition, the legislative
history fails to provide substantial and compelling evidence of congressional
intent to diminish the external boundaries of the Muscogee Nation. In fact,
Congressional understanding at the time was that Congress did not posses the
power to affect such a diminishment, because of the superior fee title held by
the Muscogee Nation in their territory. See Woodward v. De Graffenried, 238
U.S. at 294.
No. 1]
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This Court should hold that the Muscogee Nation Indian Country has not
been diminished. The Nation continues to have regulatory jurisdiction over
lands within its original external boundaries. There has been no express
congressional intent to diminish the Nation's external boundaries. Further,
because the Muscogee Nation possesses its territory in fee simple, lack of
express consent by the Muscogee Nation to any purported diminishment, at
a time when Congress believed such consent was required, compels this Court
to find that the Nation's territorial boundaries have not been diminished.
C. The Muscogee Nation Retains Inherent Power to Regulate Both Indians
and Non-Indians for the Health and Welfare of the Tribe.
. In general, absent express authorization by federal statute or treaty, Indian
tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of non-members on non-Indian
land within the external borders of a reservation. See Montana, 450 U.S. at
564. See also Strate v. A-i Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 444 (1997)
(reaffirming). In Montana, however, this Court affirmed inherent tribal power
to regulate even non-members on non-Indian land within reservation borders
when, as here, non-member conduct threatens the political integrity, economic
security, or the health and welfare of the tribe. See Montana, U.S. 450 at 556.
In the instant case, Tulsa's conduct threatens the political integrity, economic
security, and health and welfare of the Muscogee Nation.
This Court has applied the Montana principle regarding threatening conduct
by non-members in several cases. In. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), a fractured court
struggled to apply the Montana principle to a zoning scheme. Although the
actual holding in Brendale was determined by a two vote swing decision
which was too specific to the reservation in that case to be usable as
precedent,' there was a seven justice majority which agreed that a unitary
solution for regulation of reservation land was legally desirable, and the
disagreement was over the level to which the threatening conduct must rise
before that unitary jurisdiction belongs to the tribe. See Brendale, 492 U.S.
at 430.
A more recent case which applied the Montana principle was A-I
Contractors v. Strate, 520 U.S. at 445. In Strate, this Court found that a tribe
had given up adjudicatory jurisdiction over a small stretch of highway which
it had given as a federal right-of-way and which the state maintained. Id. at
456. Strate is distinct from this case in two ways. First, the tribe in Strate
was seeking to assert adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-members and non-
Indians. Id at 456. Second, adjudicatory jurisdiction would have to arise from
an event arising on the federal right of way and otherwise not affecting the
1. Otherwise, the Court has established a definition of "Indian character" which might,
depending on a particular tribe's history, result in a different constitutional standard for differing
tribes.
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health and welfare of the tribe. Id. at 457. In contrast, the Muscogee Nation
in this case is seeking to assert regulatory jurisdiction within Nation territory,
over conduct that is inherently threatening to the health and welfare of the
tribe. Courts have previously recognized that threats to water rights may
invoke inherent tribal authority over non-Indians. "A tribe retains the inherent
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands
within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect
on the health and welfare of the tribe. This includes conduct that involves the
tribes' water rights." See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42,
52 (1981). See also City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 423 (10th
Cir. 1996) (tribal promulgation of stringent water quality standards is
permissible in accord with powers of inherent sovereignty). See also Montana
v. Environmental Protection Agency, 137 F.3d 1135, 1141 (10th Cir. 1998)
(tribal promulgation of water quality standards for heavily allotted reservation
consistent with inherent sovereignty).
The fact that some landowners within Muscogee Nation boundaries cannot
become members of the tribe, nor participate in tribal government is not
pertinent to the disposition of this case. As has been repeatedly recognized by
Congress and upheld by this Court, a superior right exists when Indian tribes
act to protect tribal territory and people from substantial threats to tribal health
and welfare (even when their actions affect non-Indians on non-Indian owned
fee lands within tribal territory). See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at
556. See also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975), and
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 432.
Further, this case does not involve a situation, such as was the case in both
Montana and Brendale, where the individual property rights of non-Indian
owners of fee land are effected. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 544. See also
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 408. In this case, the subject of regulation is water
quality, something that cannot be isolated by individual land ownership, and
which directly and substantially effects the health and welfare of all of the
Muscogee Nation members. In addition, the administrative nature of
establishing and enforcing water quality standards involves extensive
procedural protections for non-Indian land holders within Muscogee Nation
territory, which Courts have held to be more than enough to protect their
interests. See Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (where full and fair
opportunity for notice and comment was provided).
D. The Muscogee Nation Legislature is Not Subject to the Presidential
Approval Power from the Curtis Act or Five Tribes Act Because the
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act Repealed that Requirement.
The language in the Indian Department Appropriations Act, Curtis Act and
Five Tribes Act which requires all Muscogee Nation legislation to be
submitted for presidential approval has been repealed by the Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Act. (OIWA) The language in the OIWA's self-government section
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taken together with the general repealer clause have already been found to
have reinstated the Muscogee Nation's authority to establish tribal courts. See
Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 670 F. Supp. 434, 446 (D.D.C. 1987). In
that case, even though the Curtis Act was found to have abolished Muscogee
Nation courts, the strong language of the self-government clause in
combination with the general repealer clause was found to have restored the
Muscogee Nation's power under the earlier 1866 Treaty to operate tribal
courts. That case's reasoning is even more compelling here because the
Muscogee Nation never lost the authority under its treaties with the U.S.
government to pass legislation. Moreover, the requirement for presidential
approval existed solely as a coercive weapon to compel allotment, and is in
direct conflict with the expressly stated purposes of OIWA.
The tripartite government of the Muscogee Nation created by the CREEK
CONSTITUTION of 1867 has survived the attempted United States congressional
statutory dismemberment of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
and has, been expressly perpetuated by the United States government. See
Harjo it. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 (D.D.C. 1976), affd. sub nom.
Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Following the judicial
decision in Harjo v. Kleppe, the Muscogee Nation held an election in which
the People adopted the MUSCOGEE (CREEK) CONSTITUTION of 1979. See
Muscogee Nation v. Hodel, 670 F. Supp. at 435. This constitution was
approved by the Secretary of the Interior on August 17, 1979. Id. It continues
to be the instrument by which the Nation maintains its governing authority
and under which the Nation carries out its substantial governmental duties.
The Constitution of the Muscogee Nation divides its tribal government into
three branches: Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. Except as provided in the
Constitution, these three departments are separate and distinct and do not
exercise the powers properly belonging to the others. See Burden v. Cox, 1
Okla. Trib. 247, 251 (Muscogee (Cr.) Nation D. Ct. 1988). Duties of the
Executive Branch of the Muscogee Nation include approval or veto of
Muscogee National Council legislation. See MUSCOGEE (CREEK)
CONSTITUTION, art. VI, § 6, sub§ A. Legislative duties of the Muscogee
National Council include legislating on matters involving the Nation
(MUSCOGEE (CREEK) CONSTITUTION, art. VI, and § 7, sub. § E), and the
creation by the National Council of courts inferior to the Muscogee Supreme
Court. Id. at art. VII, § 1. The Judicial Power of the Muscogee Nation is
vested in one Supreme Court. Id. at art. VII, and § 1. Constitutional duties
of that Court include establishing procedures to insure that an appellant
receives due process of law, and prompt, speedy relief. Id. at art. VII, § 3.
The essence of the solemn promises of the United States government to the
Nation guaranteeing its inherent right to self-government remains binding
upon the United States. See Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1143
(D.D.C. 1976). The Muscogee people are entitled to democratic self-
government. Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing
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Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. at 1144). Muscogee governmental legitimacy
is the logical and just result of the persistent and successful political struggle
of the Muscogee Nation lasting more than a century. The Muscogee Nation
is a national government capable of exercising sovereign governmental
authority and regulatory jurisdiction over its original land base conferred in
fee simple in the Removal Treaty of Mar. 24, 1832 (7 Stat. 366), and the
Treaty of June 14, 1866 (14 Stat 785).
In the alternative, even if the language in the OIWA general repealer
clause is ambiguous in regard to the presidential approval requirement in the
Curtis Act and Five Tribes Act, the language should be construed to abolish
that power because its only purpose was to coerce the tribes to assimilate.
The trust relationship between the federal government and the states requires
courts to construe statutes in the manner most beneficial to the tribe. See
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930). Therefore, even if the language in
the OIWA is ambiguous, this Court should find that the general repealer
clause of the OIWA repeals the earlier language in prior Acts which was so
adverse to Muscogee Nation self-government. This Court should find that the
continuation of such a requirement is inconsistent with Muscogee Nation
political legitimacy, and the current federal Indian policy of self-determination
and government-to-government relationships.
11. The Muscogee (Creek) Nation maintains Jurisdiction Over Waters
Within Nation Territory Which Includes thie Arkansas River under Either
the Doctrine of Non-Mutual Collateral Estoppel or the Winter's Doctrine.
Under the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel, the city of Tulsa is
precluded from asserting any claim against the Muscogee Nation for that
portion of the Arkansas River running over the riverbed within Muscogee
Nation territory. The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,
applies when: 1) the party or privy against whom the defense is raised in a
different cause of action; 2) has already had the opportunity to actually litigate
an ultimate fact or issue; 3) which was necessary to the determination of a
final judgment in an earlier action. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
Federal courts use federal preclusion doctrines when determining the
estoppel effects of a prior judgment from a federal court. See Hardy v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982). Because Federal courts
no longer require mutuality to apply collateral estoppel, application of the
doctrine is appropriate in this case so long as the other elements of that
doctrine are met. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 325 (1979).
In this case, Tulsa is arguing for state rather than Muscogee Nation water
rights, and thus is acting as a privy of the state of Oklahoma. In Choctaw
Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970), Oklahoma challenged treaty
language from the Choctaw and Cherokee treaties which was identical to the
language in the Creek Treaty of 1866. Id. at 652. That case determined that
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the language in the treaties between the U.S. government and the Five
Civilized Tribes granted title in fee to portions of the Arkansas River and
riverbed running through those Indian Nations' territories. Id.
Once the elements of collateral estoppel are met, as they are in the present
case, the party resisting preclusion must prove: 1) the party seeking to apply
collateral estoppel could have easily joined the earlier litigation; 2) that a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the ultimate issue was not provided. See
Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326. The Muscogee Nation is a sovereign entity with
political processes which must be followed before a decision to join in
litigation can be made. In this case, it would not have been easy for the
Nation to join the earlier litigation in a timely manner. In addition, Oklahoma
had every incentive for a vigorous defense in Choctaw Nation, and litigated
the issue all the way to the United States Supreme Court. There can be no
question that Oklahoma was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
fee ownership of the Arkansas riverbed that was granted to any of the Five
Civilized Tribes in their treaties. The binding effect of this judgment applies
to Oklahoma and any privy. To allow Tulsa to dispute identical language in
the Muscogee Nation treaty which this Court has already ruled on would
directly undermine the compelling reasons courts apply the doctrine of
preclusion. It would result in inconsistent rulings, and allow Oklahoma
through its privy to collaterally attack an earlier final judgment. This court
should apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to Tulsa's claim against the
Muscogee Nation for that portion of the Arkansas River riverbed running
through Muscogee Nation territory, and hold that the Nation retains
jurisdiction over that section of the Arkansas riverbed at issue in this case.
Because the Muscogee Nation maintains territorial control of the Arkansas
riverbed, the water running over it is within Indian Country and appropriate
for regulation by the Muscogee Nation.
In the alternative, if the court rejects the compelling reasons for application
of collateral estoppel in this case, the Muscogee Nation still retains its
reserved water rights in the Arkansas River under Winter's doctrine. In
addition, the Muscogee Nation also retains inherent authority under the
Winter's doctrine to regulate the quality of that water for the benefit of the
health and welfare of the Nation's people.
The Winter's Doctrine establishes that water was reserved for the
Muscogee Nation in 1832 when the land was set aside in fee simple title for
Nation territory. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). The
Winter's Doctrine establishes an implied reserved right of Indian tribes to a
quantity of water at the time a reservation is established so that reservation
environments are habitable. Id. In Oklahoma, from the time of statehood until
1978 it was wrongly assumed that there were no Indian reservations.
CLINTON, NEWTON & PRICE, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS, 1164 (1973), The Michie Company (1991). It has since been
held, however, that under the plain language of the Indian Country statute
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Indian allotments held in trust by the United States or in fee by member
Indians can also be Indian Country. See State v. Littlechief, 573 P.2d 262
(Okla. 1978) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (1976)). This ruling is equally
applicable to restricted allotments of the former Indian Territory in Eastern
Oklahoma. See State v. Burnett, 671 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Okla. Crim. App.
1983) (Indian country includes all Indian allotments with title not
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same).
Until recently, Oklahoma had been thought of as lacking Indian land with
"reservation" status because Oklahoma tribes held land in fee simple title. See
generally Ex parte Nowabbi, 61 P.2d 1139 (Okla. Crim. App. 1936). That
erroneous theory has since been expressly overruled. See State v. Klindt, 782
P.2d 401 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989). Despite subsequent turmoil resulting from,
among other things, assimilationist policies and erratic swings in federal
Indian policy, there are still lands within the exterior boundaries of the 1866
Muscogee Nation territory under Muscogee Nation jurisdiction pursuant to the
patents and promises dating back to treaties between the Nation and the U.S.
government. See Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. the
Oklahoma Tax Commission, 829 F.2d 967, 972 (1987).
The test for Indian Country is not whether the Indian land is called a
"reservation," but whether or not the land was validly set aside for Indian
tribes. See Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 498 U.S.505 (1991). See also United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S.
442, 449 (1914) (defining Indian Country). The Mackey Site in question in
this case is part of the original treaty land of the Muscogee Nation, and is the
primary site of economic development and the ceremonial for which the WQS
in question have been promulgated. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has
concluded that the Mackey Site is the purest form of Indian country; that it
is land validly set apart for the use and benefit of the Muscogee Nation. See
Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc., 829 F.2d at 976.
Thus, when land was validly set aside in fee simple for the Muscogee
Nation in 1832, and because that land is Indian country and has not been
disestablished or diminished, Winter's water rights were reserved for the
Muscogee Nation as well. This valid set aside occurred long before Oklahoma
became a state. Moreover, Oklahoma disclaimed any state jurisdiction, right,
or title over Indian lands and Congress expressly preserved Federal authority
over those lands when Oklahoma became a state. See Oklahoma Enabling
Act, June 16, 1906, § 3, 34 Stat. 270, 269 (expressly reserving federal and
tribal jurisdiction over Indians, their lands, and property). Only the tribal or
federal governments, not the state, can extinguish this jurisdictional power.
Id. Further, Oklahoma has not taken any affirmative legislative action to
assume jurisdiction under Public Law 280, and has not repealed the disclaimer
of jurisdiction over Indian country contained in the CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, art. I, § 3.
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MoreDver, assertion of state jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act (CWA)
requires that a state apply for EPA delegation of authority by demonstrating
adequate legal authority over Indian lands. See 40 C.F.R. § 123.23(b) (1993).
The state of Oklahoma tried to demonstrate such legal authority in regard to
the CWA, but later voluntarily withdrew its assertion. See 47 Fed. Reg. 27,
273-74 (upon EPA recommendation, Oklahoma expressly withdrew its
assertion to demonstrate legal authority to regulate activities within Oklahoma
Indian Country). Oklahoma has acquired EPA delegation of regulatory
jurisdiction over the Five Civilized Tribes in Eastern Oklahoma under the
Underground Injection Control program, which contains an express clause
allowing for such assumption of jurisdiction. Id. Because Oklahoma has
withdrawn its application for legal authority over the Five Civilized Tribes,
including the Muscogee Nation, with regard to the CWA, the presumption is
that federal and tribal regulatory jurisdiction controls.
In addition, by applying directly to the EPA for renewal of its NPDES
permit, Tulsa has implicitly acknowledged that it is located within territory
not subject to state jurisdiction. The state of Oklahoma was granted NPDES
permitting authority in 1996, and now has jurisdiction over the granting and
renewing of OPDES permits within state jurisdiction. By going to the EPA
to renew its permit, Tulsa is acquiescing to continued federal jurisdiction,
which is only appropriate where the state permitting authority does not have
jurisdiction to function. Consequently, by its actions Tulsa is affirming that
the territorial boundaries of the Muscogee Nation still control, and within
those boundaries either federal or tribal regulatory jurisdiction applies.
There are no cases bearing directly on the issue of the level of quality
reserved water must meet. But several cases have demonstrated a trend
toward validating the concept that the need for water quantity in a reserved
water right may also implicitly contain a standard for water quality as
indispensable to make Indian lands habitable and fulfill the purposes of the
reservation. This Court has held that the creation of an Indian reservation by
the Federal government implies an allotment of water necessary to make the
reservation livable. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599 (1963)
(overruled on other grounds). See also Arizona v. Califomia, 460 U.S. 605,
609 (1983). In United States v. Gila River Irrigation Dist., 804 F. Supp. I (D.
Ariz. 1992), the court enjoined non-Indian irrigators from diverting the river
flow, as the resultant salt content in the river was a detriment to the tribe's
right to the natural flow of the river. This Court has also suggested an
implicit element of water quality in cases when the Federal government
withdraws land from the public domain for a federal purpose, requiring that
unappropriated water appurtenant to land is reserved to the extent needed to
accomplish the purpose of the reservation. See Cappaert v. United States, 426
U.S. 128, 137 (1976).
In this case, the Muscogee Nation has promulgated WQS under the
auspices of the EPA in order to conduct ceremonies to enhance its economic
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development. Following the logic of the preceding cases, since the Muscogee
Nation lands, riverbed and waters have been reserved in fee simple for the
purpose of providing a homeland for the Nation, this water must be of such
quality, as well as quantity to be able to support the Muscogee Nation. The
reservation of Muscogee Nation territory must have included both adequate
water quantity and quality so that the Muscogee people could live on their
lands forever.
In addition, no language in the Curtis Act or the Five Tribes Act indicates
that Congress sought to affect or limit Muscogee Nation water rights. In fact,
neither of these acts contains any indication whatsoever that Congress even
considered the water rights of any of the Five Civilized Tribes. When the
Dion test is applied to the facts in this case, this Court must find that the
Muscogee Nation has not been disestablished with regard to its property rights
in the Arkansas River. Further, given the total lack of language indicating
Congressional consideration of Muscogee Nation water rights, it would be
impossible for Tulsa to meet the Solem test to find diminishment of Nation
rights in the Arkansas River.
I1. The Muscogee (Creek) Nation Meets EPA Criteria to Qualify for TAS,
and the EPA'S Approval of the Nation's TAS Application Is Valid.
The purpose of the Clean Water Act (CWA) is to establish a
comprehensive federal statutory scheme to "restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, ,and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." See Clean Water
Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988). Historically, the CWA excluded
explicit or implicit reference to Tribes and any potential tribal role in helping
to fulfill the purposes of the CWA by protecting water quality in Indian
Country. See CWA § 502(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(3) (1988) (definition of
"State" excluding reference to Tribes). However, states were precluded from
exercising regulatory jurisdiction on Indian trust lands under general principles
of federal Indian law. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,
480 U.S. 202, 216, n.18 (1987). This legislative omission resulted in
unregulated zones on tribal lands, a substantial impediment to fulfillment of
the goals of CWA. To rectify this situation, the 1987 Congress amended the
CWA, expressly authorizing the EPA Administrator to treat qualifying tribes
as states (CWA § 518 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1988)) for the
purposes of promulgating § 303 Water Quality Standards (WQS) (codified at
33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)). Congress has recognized the important role of tribes in
cleaning up the nation's waters.
By congressional statute, the EPA can delegate CWA program
implementation to Tribes for Treatment As State (TAS) for protection of
water quality in Indian Country if the tribe demonstrates these threshold
criteria: 1) the Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial
governmental duties and powers; 2) the functions to be exercised by the
Indian tribe pertain to the management and protection of water resources that
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are held by an Indian tribe, held by the United States in trust for Indians, held
by a member of an Indian tribe if such property interest is subject to a trust
restriction on alienation, or are otherwise within the borders of an Indian
reservation; and 3) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in
the EPA Administrator's judgment, of carrying out the functions to be
exercised in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes of CWA and of
all applicable regulations. See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1988). Congress
established the TAS program as a rational means to achieve water quality on
tribal lands, and its methods are entitled to great judicial deference. See
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
Pursuant to section 518, EPA promulgated five regulations advancing
criteria by which EPA will approve tribes for TAS for various CWA
programs. EPA regulations establish the basic requirements a Tribe must meet
in order to qualify for treatment as a State. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a) (tribal
qualifications for TAS status for water quality standards) and (b) (tribal
application requirements). The EPA determined that the Muscogee Nation met
each of the required criteria under the CWA that authorized the EPA to treat
it as a state for promulgation of CWA § 303 Water Quality Standards (WQS)
(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)). In making this determination, the EPA was
carrying out its statutory duty pursuant to the 1987 congressional amendments
to the CWA expressly defining "States" in CWA to include "Indian Tribes
that qualify for treatment as a state for the purpose of water quality
standards." See 40 C.F.R. § 131.3 (1991). In light of the Agency's statutory
responsibility for implementing environmental statutes, its interpretation of the
intent of Congress in allowing for tribal management of water quality within
the Mucogee Nation is entitled to substantial deference. See Washington
Dept. of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985). See also Chevron,
USA v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
A. The Muscogee Nation Is a Federally Recognized Tribe.
The Muscogee Nation is federally recognized by the Secretary of the
Interior in the U.S. Department of the Interior as an autonomous Indian tribe.
63 Fed. Reg. 71,943 (Dec. 30, 1998). As a federally recognized tribe, the
Muscogee Nation fulfills this requirement for TAS status under CWA.
B. The Muscogeee Nation is Reasonably Capable of Carrying Out the
Functions of an Effective WQS Program.
The EPA Administrator correctly determined that the Muscogee Nation is
reasonably capable of carrying out the functions of an effective WQS program
under CWA § 303. (Jt. App. 3) The Nation participates in the Inter-Tribal
Environmental Council of Oklahoma based in Tahlequah, Oklahoma. As a
member of that organization, the Muscogee Nation has access to technical
assistance from the Office of Environmental Services. Moreover, the EPA
provides technical assistance to tribes through publication of a Reference
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Guide to Water Quality Standards for Indian Tribes 4 (Jan. 1990). Tribes
qualifying for TAS status can receive funding to carry out their water quality
provisions. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e), § 104 (Research, Investigation, and
Training), and § 106 (Grants for Pollution Control). Pursuant to TAS
authority, these resources are available and confirm the Muscogee Nation's
ability to reasonably administrate an effective WQS program.
C. The Muscogee Nation Has an Independent Governing Body that
Includes Separation of Powers Between Three Branches of Government,
Each Capable of Carrying Out Substantial Governmental Duties and
Powers.
As described above, the Muscogee national government is a constitutional,
tripartite government, effectively fulfilling executive, legislative, and judicial
functions with internal separation of powers. See Muscogee (Creek) Nation,
670 F. Supp. at 443. The Muscogee Nation and its tripartite government has
successfully survived attempted statutory dismemberment and continues to
effectively govern for the health and welfare of its people, and acts
independently of any requirement for presidential approval.
Under the CWA, the EPA appropriately delegated to the Muscogee Nation
regulatory authority to promulgate § 303 Water Quality Standards. In support
of primacy for tribal governments in managing reservation environmental
programs, the EPA has a policy to avoid checkerboarding and fractionalization
of reservations into trust and fee lands. In this case, the EPA exercised its
administrative authority consistently with EPA regulations and in a manner
not contrary to law in granting TAS status to the Muscogee Nation for the
purposes of establishing water quality standards. The EPA's decision in this
case is supported by the administrative record, and is due deference from this
Court.
Conclusion
The Muscogee Nation and EPA Administrator, Carol Browner, request that
the Supreme Court uphold the decision of the Court of Appeals that the EPA's
CWA § 303 water quality program delegation to the Muscogee (Creek) Nation
is valid and enforceable.
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